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Are Japanese Firms Becoming More Independent from Their Banks?: 








The Ministry of Finance's "Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics" (Hojin 
kigyo tokei kiho) is the only statistical source of well-balanced information about the 
financing behavior of Japanese firms. Indeed, there are few comparable sources available 
anywhere in the world. Using this firm-level data set from 1994 to 2009, I investigate the 
financing behavior of Japanese firms with over ¥10 million in paid-in capital. The 
conclusions contrast sharply with the conventional wisdom. 
Much of the research and policy discussions about Japanese finance begin from 
the premise that banks play a decisive role in firm behavior. This paper shows that firms 
have maintained a dependence on financial institutions well below the level that the 
conventional wisdom has claimed. Under the recent “zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” 
monetary policy, this “independence of the firms from the banks” has increased further. 
This tendency is clearest among the smaller firms. In turn, this first conclusion raises 
doubts about the plausibility of the basic premise of research and policy debate on financial 
issues, and leads us to question whether observers may not have confused a “crisis of 
financial institutions” with a “financial crisis”. Investigation into firm financing behavior 
under the “financial crisis” from the end of 1997 to the beginning of 1999 does indeed 
suggest that it was a fiasco caused by the confusion of a “crisis of financial institutions” 
with a “financial crisis”. 
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It has long been the conventional wisdom about the Japanese firms and the 
economy that financial institutions, big banks in particular, dominate the financial 
markets where firm’s financing behavior decisively depends on borrowing from those 
institutions. As the dominant view it has maintained an overwhelmingly strong 
influence on research and policy debates in related fields. This view even today, after 
the “Lost Two Decades” since the “Burst of the Bubbles”, as a basic foundation has 
definitively conditioned the relevant research and policy debates.   
The view, symbolically written in Hoshi and Kashyap [2001, p.310] that banks 
“were the only game in town”, is widely accepted and remains as the conventional 
wisdom1 not only about the financial market in Japan before the (alleged) process of 
“financial liberalization” in the 1980s but also about most Japanese firms at present 
with the exception of small number of exceptionally excellent big companies which are 
allowed to use bond markets effectively. 2 
  Most issues that have long been repeatedly stressed as causes of the “Lost Two 
Decades” and its countermeasures, such as the banks’ reluctance to (small business) 
lending (kashi-shiburi)”3, the banks’ delay in the disposal of bad loans (furyo-saiken)’4, 
delay in improving the financial strength of financial institutions including banks, and 
(forced) increase in bank lending through continued quantitatively easing monetary 
policy, are all based on this conventional wisdom. We have been in a serious situation, if 
this conventional wisdom is based on factual errors and misconceptions and the position 
of financial institutions, large banks in particular, in the Japanese financial market and 
the roles they actually performed have been substantially below the ones the 
                                                  
1  Corporations simply “did not have alternative sources of funding until the mid 1970s,” 
explained Ito [1992, p.119]; “the domestic securities market was underdeveloped, and 
loans from abroad were not allowed.” Consequently, “Japan’s financial system was one 
of the most regulated and administratively controlled in the world” (Ito, 2000, pp.95-96). 
For a contrasting view, see Miwa and Ramseyer [2004].   
2  See Miwa and Ramseyer [2006] for the defects of the conventional wisdom about the 
Japanese economy which includes this view as a part. 
3  Although widely used for a long time, as is usual the case, kashi-shiburi is terribly 
ill-defined. 
4  Furyo-saiken and furyo-saiken-shori, although widely used even among academics, 
are terribly ill-defined, with which both academic discussions and political debates have 
long been miserably confused. On this point, see Miwa [2011c]. In this paper I use 
“bad-loans” for furyo-saiken rather than non-performing loans or “zombie lending”, and 
also the “disposal of bad-loans” for furyo-saiken-shori rather than its “write-offs” or 
“allowances” as in Japan shori in this case usually includes both.  3
conventional wisdom has long claimed. Obviously, spending much time and energy in 
prescriptions and operations based on misdiagnoses comes at a heavy price. It is of 
absolute necessity, liberating ourselves from the spell of a wrong conventional wisdom, 
to define problems and set agendas upon new assumptions and foundations for 
appropriate  prescriptions  and  operations.       
From early spring to late summer in 2010 I investigated the financing behavior 
of Japanese firms with over ¥10 million in paid-in capital, using firm-level financial 
data from “Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics” (Hojin kigyo tokei kiho; hereafter, 
CEQStat) of the Ministry of Finance. “A Study of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms 
with Firm-Level Data from Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics – 1994~2009”, 
divided into five discussion papers (Miwa, 2010b~2010f, hereafter DPI&S and 
DP1~DP4), constitutes the report. 5   The conclusions contrast sharply with the 
conventional wisdom. This paper is based on a part of the report.   
  In this research, I investigate the financing behavior of firms, rather than 
lending behavior of financial institutions. Using firm-level data from CEQStat, I could 
examine a wide variety of issues, including the validity of arguments which most 
existing research have long accepted as obvious and actively used as their common 
grounds. Some of the most basic grounds of the conventional wisdom about the 
Japanese financial phenomena are found to be false, upon which I designed and 
conducted new researches.   
  From this perspective, the most important finding of this research, which is 
also the most basic ground of this research, is the “Firm’s Low ‘Bank Dependence Ratio’ 
(=borrowings from financial institutions/ total assets)” and “Recent Further Increase in 
‘Independence of Firms from Banks’” which is clearly observed during the study period 
since FY19946, after the turn of the century in particular. For instance, during the study 
period, firm-level data show that in every size category the ratio of firms with 
zero-bank-borrowing (irrespective of whether it is short-term, long-term, or their sum) 
is extremely high and has consistently increased. Among firms with non-zero borrowing 
the bank dependence ratio has consistently varied markedly, and has recently decreased 
in chorus. This tendency is more obvious among firms in smaller size categories where 
the firms are recognized to have no other sources of funding than banks than among 
larger firms some of which with “liberalization” have become able to rely heavily on 
capital markets. 
                                                  
5  Miwa [2011a] is an English version of Miwa [2010b]. 
6  In Japan “fiscal year (FY)” begins in April. This statistics surveys information about 
all the non-financial firms with over ¥600 million in paid-in capital. In smaller size 
categories it surveys randomly sampled firms.  4
  This finding implies that one of the most basic assumptions of research and 
understanding of financial phenomena and policies and regulations related to financial 
markets has been a myth substantially deviating from the reality. As a part, the 
long-lasting policy debates about “banks’ reluctance to (small business) lending, which 
symbolizes the “Lost Two Decades” (policy) controversy, might be groundless or based on 
a wrong assumption. 
  The firm’s “bank dependence ratio” has been by far lower than the level the 
conventional wisdom has claimed, and in addition it has further decreased recently, 
which I call the “recent further increase in ‘Independence of Firms from Banks’”. With 
these findings emerge a series of questions: What was the reality of the “financial crisis” 
and “credit crunch” actualized from the end of 1997 to the beginning of 1999?; Did 
government’s policy responses work effectively?; Would the situation deteriorate into a 
grave crisis if left as it was?; and Wasn’t the reality of the “financial crisis” only a “crisis 
of financial institutions”? Together with out-dated policy responses, isn’t it appropriate 
to call a “fiasco”? 
Much of the research and policy discussions about Japanese finance begin from 
the premise that banks play a decisive role in firm behavior. What occurs if this basic 
premise would shown to be a factual error, a myth substantially deviating from the 
reality? With the findings mentioned above, many basic questions which have been set 
under seal emerge as major study issues. First appear questions such as “Was it 
appropriate as a national policy of the first order for a long time to force financial 
institutions prompt disposal of ‘bad-loans’?”, “How serious was the banks’ reluctance to 
small business lending? Was it really a serious policy concern?”, and “Was the 
traditional policy stance at first and at least to avoid bank failures?” Then come 
questions: “How and from where, besides financial institutions, firms, small firms in 
particular, raise capital? Why they raise increasing ratio of capital from sources other 
than financial institutions?”, and “What is the actual position of banks in the Japanese 
financial market and the role they perform? What is the function of trade credit, and its 
relation and division of roles with bank lending?” 
The report on which this paper is based became huge and covers a wide range 
of topics, partly because the study went into some of those issues. In this paper I report 
first the “firm’s low ‘bank dependence ratio’” and “recent further increase in 
‘independence of firms from banks’” which is both the introduction to the study and its 
most basic finding, on which then I report the reality of the “financial crisis” during 
1997-1999. Readers, stimulated by this paper interest in related issues, are expected to 
proceed to the report as a whole, focusing on the basic problem setting and the  5
discussion. 
Section II introduces the advantages of CEQStat data, and data and variables. 
Section III discusses the basic details of the “firm’s low ‘bank dependence ratio’” and 
“recent further increase in ‘independence of firms from banks’”. Upon the discussion of 
III, Section IV investigates the reality of the “financial crisis” (fiasco). In Section V, as 
an illustration of the study of relationship among variables, I compare two groups of 
firms, firms further increasing “independence of firms from banks” and firms 
non-increasing “independence”. Section VI is for concluding remarks, together with the 
list of “interesting observations” of the research to invite readers to the report on which 
this paper is based. 
        
II. Data and Variables 
 
Why Hojin kigyo tokei (Corporate Enterprise Statistics, CEStat), CEQStat in particular, 
is useful and informative? 
  In four points, CEStat, CEQStat in particular, is an excellent and useful 
statistics that provides basic information about financing behavior of Japanese firms. 
Indeed, there are few comparable sources available anywhere in the world.   
First, and above all, it provides information about financing behavior of firms 
that are on the demand side of financial market, rather than institutions in fund 
management like financial institutions on the supply side.   
  In discussing phenomena concerning economic confusion and stagnation of the 
Japanese economy during the “Lost Decade (or Two Decades)”, even when focusing on 
firm behavior, financing behavior in particular, typically the basic perspective adopted 
along the conventional wisdom has focused on the supply side of funds, particularly 
lending behavior of financial institutions including banks that have been recognized to 
dominate it. Obviously, however, firm’s source of funds is not limited to financial 
institutions (and shareholders).   
Funds borrowed by firms (households, governments, or foreign agents) from 
financial institutions are not always all used for their own business activities like 
production and facility investments (consumption, house construction, or various 
investments like R&D). Some of the borrowed funds may be invested in the financial 
market, used in increasing trade credits or obtaining shares in finance companies, 
which are finally obtained by firms on the demand side of the financial market. Firms 
use in financing necessary funds various financial markets where not only financial 
institutions but also many other types of agents including non-financial business firms  6
take part in. In order to understand adequately the firm’s financing behavior, we should 
expand the focus of study from lending behavior of financial institutions to financial 
markets, and study their roles and functions. If financial institutions were reluctant to 
lend money to small businesses, as has been claimed earnestly in Japan, by way of 
financial markets money lent to other borrowers may finally reach those small 
businesses. We should focus on financing behavior of firms on the demand side of the 
markets rather than lending behavior of financial institutions on the supply side. For 
this purpose, CEStat, CEQStat in particular, is the most useful and informative.7 
Second, CEStat (CEQStat) is the only random-sampled statistics in Japan that 
provides well balanced balance-sheet information about financing behavior of firms on 
the demand side of financial markets. On small businesses in particular, it is the only 
reliable statistics. 
Third, CEQStat surveys outstanding amount of items on firm’s balance sheet 
both at the beginning and at the end of each quarter (each year for Nenpo, Annual 
Statistics), with which we see also the actual amount of change in financial items 
during each quarter (year), for instance from April to June. In contrast, most other 
data-sets like securities filings of listed firms, Policy Investment Bank of Japan, or CRD 
(Credit Rating Database) are a collection of firm’s accounting (annual) reports. It is 
based on each firm’s choice of accounting term (year), which inevitably varies among 
firms. This variation and difference in firms’ accounting period actually surveyed might 
be a decisive constraint, with which those data-set will be fatally misleading in 
investigating the reality and impact of “financial crisis” (or “credit crunch”), for instance. 
CEQStat (CEStat) is free from this variation. 
Fourth, firms raise funds from a wide variety of sources, and, as shown below, 
the ratio of funds from financial institutions like banks to the total assets has not been 
so high as is widely perceived. Traditionally, however, at least in Japan primary source 
of financial data have been provided by the Bank of Japan, most of which is collected 
from financial institutions. As a result, they place the greatest focus on the activities of 
financial institutions, like bank lending and deposit. A wide variety of financial 
activities and transactions in financial markets tend to be out of their direct concern, 
and little information about so many important items on firm’s balance-sheet is 
                                                  
7  For questions like “What is ‘the banks’ reluctance to lending’?”, “How serious has it 
been in Japan?”, “What are the sources of trouble?”, and “What can we and should we 
do?”, see Miwa [2010a]. There may have been no such serious policy issues. Even when 
bank lending to small businesses has remarkably decreased, it may be because bank’s 
business model has lost the comparative advantage in competition in the market or 
because it is inefficient.    7
available in widely used financial data-set (or statistics). In contrast, by directly 
collecting data from financing firms, CEStat (CEQStat) provides rich information about 
items which have been neglected or viewed as unimportant by the authorities and 
researchers of financial markets. In the research on which this paper is based, I place 
focus also on deposit, receivables, payables, and inventory. 
 
Advantage of firm-level data 
  In addition to the points mentioned above, this research enjoys an advantage of 
firm-level data. Reflecting various factors and constraints, financing behavior of firms is 
too complex and diverse to capture with aggregate values or sample mean values, 
assuming a representative firm in each size category. Although CEStat (CEQStat) 
collects useful and informative data, by publishing the results basically in aggregates 
values its potentials have not been fully exploited. 8 By using firm-level data, I 
investigate in detail the issues beyond the reach of aggregate value data, and find 
interesting results. 
Among the interesting results, it is the finding and verification with firm 
evidence of phenomena which I name “the Independence of Firms from Banks”, 
particularly of small businesses, that I consider to have the most important direct 
impact on the research of financial markets in Japan. Only with the firm-level data, I 
could find and confirm the phenomena.   
  The conventional wisdom, due to little interest of people including the financial 
authorities and researchers, argues roughly: “Trade credit is a financing method for 
inventory fund”. A simple study of relationship between outstanding values of inventory 
and trade credits (receivables and payables) with firm-level data raises serious doubts 
to this view, however. By liberating ourselves from the spell of this kind of conventional 
wisdom, we will be able to begin a real study of firm’s financing behavior, including 
trade credit and its relation with bank borrowings. 
 
Data and Variables9 
In this research I use firm-level data from the Corporate Enterprise Quarterly 
Statistics (CEQStat), with the exception of the parts on long-run trend where I use 
summary statistics from the Corporate Enterprise Annual Statistics (CEAStat). 
CEQStat classifies firms into 5 size categories, in the size of paid-in capital at the 
                                                  
8  Obviously, aggregate values published in reports are quite informative, as shown in 
Section 8 of DP1 ([1-8]), but those published aggregate values have not fully utilized in 
the previous literature. 
9  For more details, see [I&S-3] of Miwa[2011].  8
beginning of fiscal year. 5 categories are, 10~20, 20~50, 50~100, 100~1,000, respectively 
in million yen, and more than ¥1 billion. Hereafter, I use notation from 5 to 9, 
respectively, for each size category (v4). CEQStat calls the firms in 3 smaller categories 
“small firms (literally, small and medium firms)”, those in v4=8 “mid-sized”, and those 
in v4=9 “big firms”.   
  CEQStat is a sample survey, whose sample rates greatly differ across size 
categories. As a result, summary statistics over all the samples surveyed, depending on 
the sample rates and the sampling method, do not reflect the composition of population. 
CEQStat randomly samples approximately the following number of firms from each size 
category: v4=5, 4,000; v4=6, 4,000; v4=7, 2,000; v4=8, 10,00010  ; and v4=9, all firms. 
  For illustration, Table 1 shows the situation of the survey in the 3rd quarter in 
FY2004. 
Table 1. Situation of the Survey: 3rd Quarter of FY2004 (Oct.-Dec. in 2004)
Paid-in Capital (\million） 10～99 100～999 1,000~ total
Number of Firms Surveyed 9,630 9,930 5,761 25,321
Number of Respondents 6,584 8,129 5,333 20,046
Response rate （％） 68.4 81.9 92.6 79.2  
    With the exception of the category for the big firms (v4=9) where survey is a 
census, CEQStat is a sample survey in which the samples surveyed are all renewed at 
the beginning of each fiscal year, at the beginning of April. All the sample firms are 
requested to report over 4 quarters on items (primarily financial items) both at the 
beginning and the end of the quarter. Therefore, with the exception of v4=9, firms 
surveyed in different fiscal years are basically different. On most firms surveyed, data 
only on 5 data points, including the data at the beginning of the 1st quarter, are 
available. 
  In what follows I use notations like 200104, which stands for the 4th quarter of 
FY2001, that is, January~March 2002.   
Basically in this research I use two types of variables, “level variables” and 
“difference variables”. Suppose yit stands for the outstanding amount of financial item i 
at time t, short-term borrowings from financial institutions, for instance, and wt the 
total assets. The first type of variables, level variables, lit, is yit-1/wt-1(*100), and the 
second one, dit, is (yit-1 – yit)/wt-1(*100). 
Note that I use the ratios of financial items, typically “level variables”, lit, like 
the ratio of short-term borrowings to total assets (“short-term bank dependence ratio”), 
at the beginning of the quarter, in which the ratio at 200104 stands for the one at the 
                                                  
10  In this category, actually all firms with more than ¥600 million in paid-in capital are 
surveyed.  9
end of the 3rd quarter in FY2001, at the end of December 2001. Therefore, lit = 
yit-1/wt-1(*100). Also for “difference variables”, dit, the ratio at 200104 stands for the ratio 
of change during the 4th quarter in FY2001 to the total assets at the beginning of the 4th 
quarter in FY2001. Therefore, dit = (yit-1 – yit)/wt-1(*100). 
Table 2 shows the list of variables. 
Table2. List of Variables
outstanding amount level variable difference variable
(at the end of the quarter) dependence ratio change in dependence ratio
composition ratio change in composition ratio


















































































































v4: firm　size category (=5, 6, 7, 8, 9)  
In CEStat, both CEQStat and CEAStat, classifies firms with the size of paid-in 
capital. For readers’ convenience, I show below the average number of persons engaged 
in firms in each size category, first in all industries surveyed (Table 3a) and then in the 
manufacturing industry (Table 3b). Here I show the picture for the 3rd quarter in 
FY2004. Reader should note that, although it might be so serious for the main body of 
the research where I use firm-level data since FY1994, during the period since the 
1960s over which I show an overview of long-run trends the correspondence between 
firm-size in paid-in capital and the one in the number of persons engaged has changed 
dramatically. Here I follow the notations for firm size classification in CEQStat. 10~19 
stands for ¥10 million~¥20 million. 
Table 3a. The Average Number of Persons Engaged in Firms: All Industries
（unit: \million, number of persons)
total 10~19 20~49 50~99 100~999 1,000~
Number of Firms (N) 1,183,393 886,946 211,109 51,087 28,490 5,761
Number of Managers (M) 3,043,159 2,068,178 635,107 168,385 117,733 53,756
Number of Employees （L) 33,071,882 10,768,648 6,510,881 3,782,220 5,255,074 6,755,059
M+L 36,115,041 12,836,826 7,145,988 3,950,605 5,372,807 6,808,815
M/N 3 2 3 3 4 9
L/N 28 12 31 74 184 1,173
(M+L)/N 31 14 34 77 189 1,182  
  10
Table 3b. The Average Number of Persons Engaged in Firms: Manufacturing Industry
（unit: \million, number of persons)
total 10~19 20~49 50~99 100~999 1,000~
Number of Firms (N) 211,326 154,922 35,996 11,129 6,987 2,292
Number of Managers (M) 608,684 402,211 112,776 39,295 30,965 23,437
Number of Employees （L) 9,259,530 2,281,233 1,495,042 1,087,582 1,364,876 3,030,797
M+L 9,868,214 2,683,444 1,607,818 1,126,877 1,395,841 3,054,234
M / N 3 3344 1 0
L/N 44 15 42 98 195 1,322
(M+L)/N 47 17 45 101 200 1,333  
 
The study period: from FY1994 to the 2nd quarter of FY2009 
  Focusing on the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999, Miwa [2008] studied the data 
over 7 years, from FY1994 to FY2000. The present research extends the study period to 
FY1994~the 2nd Quarter of FY2009, 15 and half years. The world financial market has 
changed drastically, particularly since the 2nd half of the 1990s, which is widely believed 
to be one of the causes of the “financial crisis” since the summer of 2007 and its 
protracting serious impacts. In relation to the turbulent days, particularly since the 
“Lehman Shock” in the fall of 2008, the reality and policy responses in Japan during the 
“Lost Two Decades”, including the Japanese experience in its “Credit Crunch” in 
1997-1999 gather wide attention, often calling them cynically the “Japanese lessons”. 
By extending the study period to the 2nd quarter of FY2009, we can investigate its 
impacts on firm’s financing behavior in Japan. In addition, we can investigate the 
effects of the long lasting “quantity easing monetary policy under zero-interest-rate”. 
For readers’ and expositional convenience, I divide the study period from 
FY1994 to the 2nd quarter of FY2009 into two parts, the first half of 8 years up to 
FY2001 and the second half of 7 and half years from FY2002, and in many cases I 
calculate the period average values. For example, as the long lasting “quantity easing 
monetary policy under zero-interest-rate” has been maintained throughout the second 
half period under which the “Independence of Firms from Banks” further increased, 
those comparisons would provide some hints for understanding its sources and 
mechanism. 
 
III. The Low “Bank Dependence Ratio” and the Further Increase in “Independence of 
Firms from Banks”   
 
  Section III is a summary of the basic part of Miwa [2010b], entitled “The Low 
‘Bank Dependence Ratio’ and the Further Increase in ‘Independence of Firms from 
Banks’”.  11
    Much of the research and policy discussions about Japanese finance begin from 
the premise that financial institutions, big banks in particular, have dominated the 
Japanese financial market and played there the key roles. This research begins with 
pointing out that this conventional wisdom is and has been a misunderstanding and 
misconception, a myth substantially deviating from the reality. As a result, from the 
beginning to end, this research has a wide variety of and grave implications both to 
research and policy discussions on Japanese finance. 
 
Number of zero-short-term-borrowing firms and its ratio to the total 
  Emphasizing the relationship with the “banks’ reluctance to lending”, first of 
all I focus here on firm’s short-term borrowing11 from financial institutions. (Miwa 
[2010b] also investigates firm’s long-term borrowing and total borrowing, that is, the 
sum of short-term and long term borrowing.) 
  Here I show the figure for the smallest firms’ group (v4=5, Figure 1) and the 
list of group averages (Table 4, from [I-2-3], which indicates the corresponding part of 













Figure 1 shows the number of non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms (red) and 
zero-borrowing firms at the beginning of each quarter (yellow), zero-borrowing firms at 
the end (green), zero-borrowing firms both at the beginning and the end (purple), and 
all the firms surveyed (blue). For readers’ convenience I insert a vertical line on 200104, 
at the mid-period. 
(1)  Three numbers of zero-borrowing firms, at the beginning, at the end, and at both 
                                                  
11  Borrowing with remaining term less than a year is classified as “short-term”, and 
otherwise as “long-term”. Total borrowing is the sum of “short-term” and “long-term”.   
Figure1. Number of firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing,
positive-short-term-bank borrowing, and total number:













points of time, are always almost the same. It implies that most firms with 
zero-borrowing at the beginning end the quarter with zero-borrowing.   
(2)  The ratio of non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms has consistently fallen during 
the study period, to the level of the half around FY1998, and to the 1/3 in FY2009. 
Table 4 lists the group average of ratios, first for all firms and then for each size 
category. 0-0/T is the ratio of firms with zero-borrowing both at the beginning and end of 
the quarter to all the firms surveyed. I divide the survey period into two parts, until 
FY2001 and FY2002 and after, and show the average of ratios, as Average 1 and 
Average 2, respectively. Average T is for the whole period, and Av.1 - Av.2 is for their 
difference, that is, Average 1 - Average 2. It is the smallest firms’ group (v4=5) where 
those ratios are the highest (47.3, 61.5, 54.2) and the difference (Av.1 - Av.2) is the 
largest (-14.2).   
Table 4. Ratios of the number of firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing both at the beginning and the end of the quarter,
      and of firms with zero-change in short-term-bank-borrowing during the quarter: averages by period and their differences
　　　　　　　　All industries, by firm size (unit: %)
all firm sizes v4=5 v4=6
nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochangenochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange
Average 1 41.4 30.7 74.1 62.2 47.3 75.9 48.7 36.2 74.2
Average 2 53.1 42.4 79.8 75.0 61.5 82.0 60.4 47.7 78.9
Average T 47.1 36.4 76.8 68.4 54.2 78.9 54.4 41.8 76.5
Av.1 - Av.2 -11.7 -11.8 -5.8 -12.8 -14.2 -6.1 -11.7 -11.5 -4.7
v4=7 v4=8 v4=9
nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochangenochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange
Average 1 43.9 32.8 74.8 39.9 29.8 74.7 30.7 21.7 70.8
Average 2 56.1 44.7 79.7 52.2 42.7 81.7 42.3 32.0 75.7
Average T 49.8 38.6 77.2 45.9 36.1 78.1 36.3 26.7 73.2
Av.1 - Av.2 -12.2 -11.9 -4.9 -12.4 -12.9 -7.0 -11.6 -10.3 -5.0  
 
Short-term bank dependence ratio (l1t) 
  From the cumulative distribution of firm’s “short-term bank dependence ratio”, 
the ratio of short-term-borrowing to total assets at the beginning of each quarter, I show 
the transition of p10, p25, p50, p75, p90 (p stands for percentile) in the following 3 
figures, for all firms (Figure 2a), for firms in v4=5 (Figure 2b), and v4=8 (Figure 2c). All 
three figures consistently show that non-zero-short-term borrowing firms in every size 
category have constantly decreased the short-term bank dependence ratio.    13
Figure 2a. Distribution of short-term loan share (l
1
t):



















Figure 2b. Distibution of short-term loan share (l
1
t):



















Figure 2c. Distiribution of shor-term loan share (l
1
t):




















Table 5 shows the period averages of those percentile values, first for all firms and then 
for each size category. In every size category, the short-term bank dependence ratios of  14
positive-short-term-borrowing firms fell during the study period. 
Table 5. Distribution of short-term-bank-borrowing ratio (l
1
t)all industries, by size
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
all firm szies Average 1 0.00 0.00 6.79 21.67 39.25
Average 2 0.00 0.00 2.03 14.57 29.76
Average T 0.00 0.00 4.49 18.23 34.66
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 0.00 4.76 7.11 9.49
v4=5 Average 1 0.00 0.00 1.56 18.09 42.31
Average 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.82 28.96
Average T 0.00 0.00 0.80 13.60 35.85
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 0.00 1.56 9.26 13.36
v4=6 Average 1 0.00 0.00 5.29 20.50 39.87
Average 2 0.00 0.00 0.72 14.32 31.34
Average T 0.00 0.00 3.08 17.51 35.74
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 0.00 4.57 6.18 8.52
v4=7 Average 1 0.00 0.00 6.17 20.97 38.70
Average 2 0.00 0.00 1.56 15.03 31.27
Average T 0.00 0.00 3.94 18.10 35.10
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 0.00 4.61 5.94 7.43
v4=8 Average 1 0.00 0.00 8.19 23.92 41.35
Average 2 0.00 0.00 2.20 15.94 31.65
Average T 0.00 0.00 5.29 20.06 36.66
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 0.00 5.99 7.98 9.70
v4=9 Average 1 0.00 0.29 7.56 20.13 34.81
Average 2 0.00 0.00 3.84 14.09 26.10
Average T 0.00 0.15 5.76 17.21 30.59
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 0.29 3.71 6.05 8.71  
 
Total bank dependence ratio (l7t) 
  Concerning “total borrowing” (= short-term borrowing + long-term borrowing), 
I show the figure on the transition of total bank dependence ratio for the smallest 
firms (v4=5, Figure 3) and the summary table (Table 6) corresponding to Table 5 
shown above (from I-2-5). What shown above is not peculiar to short-term bank 
dependence ratio, that is, the ratio of short-term borrowing.  15
Figure 3. Distribution of total-bank-borrowing ratio (l
7
t):


















Table 6. Distribution of total-bank-borrowing ratio (l
7
t): all industries, by size, unit=%
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
all firm sizes Average 1 0.00 2.88 25.81 51.06 73.03
Average 2 0.00 0.00 14.64 40.47 63.04
Average T 0.00 1.49 20.41 45.94 68.20
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 2.88 11.17 10.59 9.98
v4=5 Average 1 0.00 2.69 28.79 56.60 78.79
Average 2 0.00 0.00 21.00 54.01 78.31
Average T 0.00 1.39 25.02 55.35 78.56
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 2.69 7.78 2.59 0.48
v4=6 Average 1 0.00 7.87 32.56 56.52 75.91
Average 2 0.00 0.35 26.19 52.97 73.55
Average T 0.00 4.23 29.48 54.80 74.77
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 7.52 6.37 3.54 2.37
v4=7 Average 1 0.00 5.28 32.26 56.10 76.42
Average 2 0.00 0.00 23.52 51.04 71.06
Average T 0.00 2.73 28.03 53.65 73.82
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 5.28 8.74 5.06 5.36
v4=8 Average 1 0.00 1.85 26.19 51.63 73.47
Average 2 0.00 0.00 11.72 38.12 59.36
Average T 0.00 0.95 19.19 45.10 66.64
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 1.85 14.47 13.51 14.12
v4=9 Average 1 0.00 2.68 19.51 41.87 65.12
Average 2 0.00 0.00 11.03 30.19 48.55
Average T 0.00 1.39 15.40 36.22 57.10
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 2.68 8.48 11.68 16.56  
Everywhere, in smaller firms’ categories in particular, there are rather a small group 
of firms with extreme high total bank dependence ratio. For instance, the p90 value 
for v4=5 remains at the level of almost 80%, which however says that only 10% of 
firms in this category borrow more than 80% of their funds. In the second half-period, 
the p25 value is 0 almost everywhere, and in the categories of v4=7~v4=9 the ratios  16
remarkably fell everywhere as shown in Av.1 – Av.2. 
 
Net short-term bank dependence ratio (l8t） 
  Bank borrowing, including short-term bank borrowing, is a part of firm-bank 
trade relationship. In this light Miwa [2010b] (I-5~I-6]) focuses on deposit (and cash). 
During the study period, although “Bank Dependence Ratios” remarkably fell, the 
ratio of deposit to total assets remained at the same level, or rather moved upwards 
(I-4).   
Firms hold deposit for various purposes, and in Miwa [2010b] I focus on deposit 
from various perspectives. If a reader pays particular attention to short-term 
confusion in financial market such as “credit crunch”, “financial panic”, or drastic 
tightening, he recognizes deposit as a buffer for them and be interested in the level 
and movement of the net short-term bank dependence ratio, that is (short-term bank 
borrowing minus deposit)/total assets.   
Here I introduce part of the results on this new short-term bank dependence 
ratio. I show the figure on the transition of net short-term bank dependence ratio for 
the smallest firms (v4=5, Figure 4) and the summary table (Table 7) corresponding to 
the above Table 5 (from I-5-2).   
Figure 4. Distribution of net-short-term-bank-dependence ratio (l
8
t):




















The p75 value has consistently stayed at the level of 0%, which means that only 25% of 
firms in this size category hold short-term borrowing larger than their bank deposit. 
The p90 value is at the level of 10% recently.  17
  Table 7 shows that what shown above is not peculiar to firms in v4=5. Also by 
net short-term bank dependence ratio, firms’ “Bank Dependence Ratio” has not been so 
high as the conventional wisdom has argued, and recently their “Independence from 
Banks” has further increased remarkably.   
Table 7. Distribution of net-short-term-bank-borrowing ratio (l
8
t): all industries, by size
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
all firm sizes Average 1 -27.45 -11.49 -0.98 12.34 30.39
Average 2 -34.02 -15.55 -3.05 5.56 21.51
Average T -30.63 -13.45 -1.99 9.06 26.09
Av.1 - Av.2 6.57 4.06 2.07 6.77 8.89
v4=5 Average 1 -43.28 -23.32 -7.93 2.64 25.83
Average 2 -49.31 -27.45 -9.97 -0.40 15.10
Average T -46.20 -25.32 -8.92 1.17 20.63
Av.1 - Av.2 6.02 4.13 2.03 3.04 10.73
v4=6 Average 1 -36.16 -18.74 -5.40 5.74 24.68
Average 2 -43.33 -23.52 -8.14 1.19 17.89
Average T -39.63 -21.05 -6.72 3.54 21.39
Av.1 - Av.2 7.17 4.79 2.73 4.55 6.78
v4=7 Average 1 -29.09 -13.36 -2.54 9.08 27.27
Average 2 -35.81 -17.73 -4.73 3.60 21.02
Average T -32.34 -15.48 -3.60 6.43 24.24
Av.1 - Av.2 6.71 4.37 2.19 5.48 6.25
v4=8 Average 1 -23.39 -8.65 0.00 15.34 33.58
Average 2 -32.82 -14.25 -2.29 6.75 23.86
Average T -27.95 -11.36 -1.11 11.18 28.88
Av.1 - Av.2 9.42 5.60 2.30 8.59 9.73
v4=9 Average 1 -18.98 -7.24 0.72 14.02 29.55
Average 2 -22.21 -9.43 -0.79 8.12 20.89
Average T -20.54 -8.30 -0.01 11.16 25.36
Av.1 - Av.2 3.23 2.18 1.51 5.90 8.66  
 
Long-run trend 
  The period of my study with firm-level data is from FY1994 to the second 
quarter of FY2009. Not a few readers might wonder if the conclusion applies also to the 
period before the study period, for instance to the 1960s and the 1970s, as the Japanese 
economy had changed drastically through “liberalization” in the 1980s, and the 
“Bubble” in the second half of the 1980s and its burst in he 1990s. Readers should ask 
themselves on what logical grounds and evidences the conventional wisdom is founded 
and supported. CEStat has been almost the only well-organized and balanced statistical 
data on firm’s financing behavior, and this statistics has rarely been actively used for its 
study. 
  Assuming a question, “How was the firm’s financing behavior before the study 
period?”, in [I-7], using summary statistics from CEAStat, I show the long-run trend of  18
key financial variables (“level variables”) since FY1960.12  
    For instance, for firms from ¥10 million to ¥50 million in paid-in capital that 
corresponds the CEQStat’s v4=5 and 6, the short-term bank dependence ratio started 
with the level below 20% and until very recently remained around 15% level, which has 
not been remarkably different from that of bigger firms. As the long-term bank 
dependence ratio remained around 10% everywhere (I-7-3), total bank dependence ratio 
was not so high as the conventional wisdom argues. 
The ratio of receivables to total assets, “receivable dependence ratio” (l4t), is the 
most impressive. Here the results are on all industries (I-7-6-1). In the 1960s and 1970s 
this ratios were at the level of 30% everywhere, which were higher than the short-term 
bank dependence ratios. In the 2000s firms from ¥10 million to ¥50 million is slightly 
above 15%, approximately the half of the 1960s level, which is lower than that of bigger 
firms. 
This is the receivable dependence ratio, rather than the payable dependence 
ratio. In the 1960s, the heyday of the “dual structure” theory, large firms with 
advantageous position in the market supplied (relent) to smaller firms as trade credit, 
the conventional wisdom argues. Their receivable dependence ratio, however, was at 
almost the same level as the one of small businesses. It is small businesses rather than 
large firms that decreased this dependence ratio remarkably, through the process of 
“liberalization” and development in financial market. 
 
IV. The Reality of the “Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch” (Fiasco)   
   
Section IV is a summary of the basic part of Miwa [2010c], entitled “The 
Reality of Short-term Shocks like the ‘Credit Crunch’ of 1997-1999 and the ‘Financial 
Crisis’ of 2007, and the Effectiveness of ‘Emergency’ Economic Measures – A Follow-up 
to Miwa [2008]”. As a follow-up to Miwa [2008], in Miwa [2010c] I investigate the reality 
of the “credit crunch” of 1997-1999 in a wider perspective. Also, I study the influence 
both of various “emergency economic measures” adopted as countermeasures and of the 
ultra-easy credit policy that has lasted after the “crunch”. I focus as well on the 
influence of the recent “financial crisis” of 2007. 
In Miwa [2008], I investigated individual firm’s financing behavior, including 
borrowings from financial institutions, during the “financial crisis” or “credit crunch”, 
from the end of 1997 to the beginning of 1999 in particular. For this purpose, I studied 
firm-level financial data of approximately 6,000 non-financial firms with more than 
                                                  
12  For a brief summary of this part, see [I&S-4] of Miwa [2011].  19
¥600 million in paid-in capital from CEQStat financial data, from FY1994 to FY2000. 
The present research extends the study period to FY1994~the 2nd Quarter of FY2009. 
The conventional wisdom argues that there was a serious “credit crunch” in 
Japan during this period, particularly between the end of 1997 and the beginning of 
1999. I examined the short-term variations (quarter, semi-annual, and annual) in not 
only of bank borrowings (short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, and total 
borrowing) but also of payables, receivables, deposits, and inventory, and also 
correlations between those financial variables. I found, however, no clear sign of serious 
“credit crunch”. It is unclear on what ground the conventional wisdom is based, and 
little empirical supporting evidence is presented.13 From this observation I concluded 
not to accept the argument that during the period from the end of 1997 to the beginning 
of 1999 there was a serious “credit crunch” in Japan. With its non-existence, I also 
concluded that the “policies” alleged to be adopted for its prevention and alleviation 
were ineffective. 
No serious criticism or rebuttal statement has appeared since the publication 
of Miwa [2008]. In the discussion on the development and countermeasures toward the 
worldwide “financial crisis (or panic)” that became obvious since July 2007, not a few 
argued to learn from the Japanese experiences (including policy failures) of a decade 
ago. If the suggested Japanese “experiences” is the conventional wisdom that is based 
on misconceptions and misunderstanding on the basic facts of the reality both of the 
“financial crisis” that actually occurred in Japan and of adopted countermeasures and 
their effectiveness, misunderstandings might lead to another more grave confusion and 
tragedy (or comedy).14 
                                                  
13  For the details on this point, see pp.14~21 of Miwa [2008]. Observers have often 
referred to the DI (Diffusion Index) on “lending position of financial institutions” 
provided by the Bank of Japan as a supporting evidence of the serious “credit crunch”. I 
wrote there (p.18) as follows. The next 3rd point is the most important. “Do the 
questionnaire and the firm’s responses on which the DI is based include relevant and 
appropriate information positive users of this DI presume?” After careful examination, 
few would answer “YES” to this question, I predict. Unless being able to answer “YES” 
to this question, it must be impossible for reader to accept, upon a chart of this DI’s 
movement, the conventional wisdom that there was a serious “credit crunch”. For more 
details of critically reviewing DI discussions, see Section IX of Miwa [2011c].   
14  The conventional wisdom, dominant at least in Japan, argues that the recent 
“financial crisis” had influenced only slightly, if any, the Japanese economy, which 
differs substantially from that of the “financial crisis” or the “credit crunch” at the end 
of the 1990s. However, as shown in Miwa [2008] in Japan during 1997~1999 there was 
no clear sign of serious influence of the “credit crunch”, and during the recent “financial 
crisis” I find in every size category of firms a dramatic decrease both in receivables and 
payables, particularly in the third quarter of FY2008, that is immediately after the 
“Lehman Shock”. If we classify it as part of the “shadow banking system”, Japan  20
In size categories smaller than ¥600 million in paid-in capital, at the beginning 
of each fiscal year (in April) CEQStat randomly selects all the firms to survey, and Miwa 
[2008] focused on firms with firms with larger than ¥600 million in paid-in capital. 
Because of this circumscription, there remains a strong interest in a question: “Does the 
same conclusion apply also to smaller firms with less than ¥600 million in paid-in 
capital? Is the situation different?”   
Some seem to be frustrated, arguing: “It was credit crunch or banks’ reluctance 
to small businesses lending that was serious during that period, and it is off target like 
this study to focus only on large companies.” As shown in Section II, in 2004 the average 
number of employees in firms in category between ¥100 million~¥1 billion paid-in 
capital was below 200, and with more than ¥1 billion was slightly more than 1,000. 
Neither persuasive theoretical ground nor powerful empirical evidence has been 
presented to support and confirm the validity of the conventional wisdom: “There was a 
serious credit crunch, particularly to small businesses.” In Miwa [2008, pp.154-56], I 
tentatively countered to this kind of argument. 
The primary focus of this research is placed on small businesses rather than on 
big enterprises. Little well-balanced information has been presented concerning 
financing behavior of Japanese small businesses including borrowings from financial 
institutions, and therefore few know it in detail and accurately. With these two reasons, 
in this research I organize basic information about financing behavior of Japanese firms, 
focusing on small businesses.   
As smaller firms with less than ¥600 million in paid-in capital surveyed are 
replaced every fiscal year, we cannot conduct completely the same investigation with 
firms in smaller size categories as in Miwa [2008]. 
 
Influence of and countermeasure to the situation that there were so many 
zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms 
  Particularly in smaller firm groups there were so many zero-short-term-bank- 
borrowing firms, whose ratio further increased during the study period. Most firms with 
zero-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter remain the same at the 
end. Under such a situation, where the ratio of those firms is more than a half, the basic 
measure of this research, also adopted in Miwa [2008], to focus on the distribution of 
short-term-bank-borrowing “difference variable”, the ratio of change in short-term- 
borrowing during the quarter to total assets at the beginning, might face serious 
troubles. In addition, there must be non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms with 0 change 
                                                                                                                                                  
suffered its serious contraction, we should say.  21
simply because of borrowing period longer than a quarter.   
Table 3 introduced at the beginning of Section III shows also nonchange/T and 
0-0/nonchange. The former is the ratio of the number of firms with non-change to all 
firms, and the latter is the ratio of firms with zero-short-term-borrowing both at the 
beginning and the end to the number of non-change firms. Among the smallest firms in 
v4=5, for instance, in the second half period, the former was 75%, and the latter was 
82%. Then, such a dominance of 0-0 firms might seriously affect the studies with 
short-term-bank-borrowing “difference variable”. 
If, for example, we draw a conclusion: “There were few small businesses which 
were obliged to reduce and actually reduced borrowings from financial institutions even 
during the ‘credit crunch’ period”, we have to prepare ourselves to accept a criticism: “It 
might be a false observation or an illusion that comes up with a dominance of 
information about the firms that had completed their ‘Independence from Banks’ over 
that about firms with non-zero-bank-borrowing. Cleaning up such a noise, we have to 
focus on firms that needed to borrow from financial institutions.” 
As shown in Figure 5, the ratio of non-zero-short-term-bank borrowing firms 
was lower in smaller firm group. It fell drastically in every group during the study 
period. 
  Nonetheless, by focusing only on firms with more than ¥600 million in paid-in 
capital and limiting the study period to FY1994~FY2000, fortunately, its influence to 
the conclusion of Miwa [2008] seems to be relatively minor.   
Figure 5. Ratio of Positive-short-term-bank-borrowing firms:







































Figure 6 shows the transition of p10, p25, p50, p75, p90 values of the  22
distribution of short-term-bank-borrowing “difference variable”. Actually, most probably 
due primarily to the influence in the ratio of non-change firms, the distribution seems to 
be rapidly concentrating around 0 value, like “collapsing” from both sides. This figure is 
about all the firms in all industries.   
Figure 6. Distribution of Changes in Short-term-bank-dependence ratio (d
1
t):















I tried two countermeasures: the first is to exclude firms with zero-short-term- 
borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (Modified Sample 1); and the second is to 
exclude firms with non-change in short-term-borrowing (Modified Sample 2). 
Confirming that those two countermeasures draw similar results, mostly in this 
research I took the first one (Modified Sample 1). 
 
“Credit Crunch”?: a follow-up of Miwa [2008] 
  Figure 7a shows the distribution of short-term-bank-borrowing “difference 
variable” for firms in v4=5, with Modified Sample 1 (II-3-1).    23
Figure 7a. Distribution of changes in Short-term-bank-dependence ratio
(d
1



































What is prominent here is the shift of distribution in the 3rd quarter of FY1998, 
suggesting a drastic increase in small firm’s borrowing, which is most probably a 
consequence of temporary explosion of their borrowing stimulated by “the Special 
Credit Guarantee Policy” for small businesses that began in October 1998 and ended in 
March 2001.   
  Figure 7b is the corresponding one for v4=8. As the “Policy” was for small 
businesses, there is no such a drastic shift in 199803.15  (Hereafter, often I show figures 
for V4=5 and 8, the former for representative of small businesses and the latter for 
larger firms.) 
                                                  
15  For the details of this Policy, see Miwa [2010a]. Under this policy scheme, it was 
profitable to borrow in long-term, 5 to 7 years. The shift of distribution is more 
prominent in corresponding figures on long-tem borrowing, shown in [II-4-1] and 
[II-5-2]. The shift is clearly observed in figures both for v4=5 and 6, nothing for v4=8 
and v4=9, and a slight shift for v4=9, for firms with ¥50~¥100 million in paid-in capital.    24
Figure 7b. Distribution of Changs in Short-term-bank-dependence ratio
(d
1

















Distribution of level variables (lit): 
The ratio of receivables, payables, or inventory to total assets 
  From the second half of Miwa [2010c] to Miwa [2010e], I expand the 
examination items from transaction items with financial institutions like borrowing 
and deposit to a wider variety of balance-sheet items. The major focus is placed on 
receivables and payables, and also inventory often alleged to be closely connected with 
them. [II-6] and [II-7] focus on the level variables, the ratio of receivables, payables, or 
inventory to total assets, and [II-8]~[II-11] on the difference variables, the ratio of 
change in deposits, receivables, payables, or inventory to total assets. 
  The primary purpose of the second half of Miwa [2010c] is to organize the basic 
information. For illustration, I introduce here, for v4=5 and 8, the distribution of the 
ratio of payable to total asset (l5t), that is (might be) close substitute for bank borrowing 
(Figure 8a and Figure 8b, II-6-2）.  25
Figure 8a. Distribution of Payable-dependence ratio (l
5
t):
















Figure 8b. Distribution of Payable-dependence ratio (l
5
t):
















In either class the ratio has been widely distributed, and it has been 
consistently lower in v4=5 than in v4=8. What those figures show is far from the 
schematic unilateral relation in the conventional wisdom that small business has 
obtained credit from large firms through payables.   
  Rapid decrease in the payable/(total asset) ratio during the recent “financial 
crisis”, not during the former “credit crunch”, is prominent. The same applies also to the 
receivable/(total asset) ratio (II-6-1). The reason and mechanism are unexplored, yet. 
  The ratio of inventory to total asset has been consistently much lower than 
either the receivable/(total asset) ratio or the payable/(total asset) ratio. In addition, 
unlike the latter two ratios, during the recent “financial crisis”, the inventory/(total 
asset) ratio has not decreased (II-7). The conventional wisdom that trade credit has 
been used for inventory finance will be under pressure for reevaluation. 
  What shown above holds with little modification when I limit the examination 
to the manufacturing sector.  26
 
Distribution of difference variables (dit) 
In [II-8]~[II-11], I examine the distribution of difference variables (dit), the ratio 
of change in deposits, receivables, payables, or inventory to total assets, respectively. 
For illustration, I introduce here, for v4=5 and 8, the distribution of the ratio of 
change in payable to total asset (d5t, Figure 9a and Figure 9b, II-10-1).   
Figure 9a. Distribution of Changes in Payable-dependence ratio (d
5
t):



































Figure 9b. Distribution of Changes in Payable-dependence ratio (d
5
t):



































    In either class the ratio has been widely distributed. Nowhere I find a 
prominent movement of the distribution of change in payable dependence ratio, for 
instance, in that of small businesses during the “credit crunch” or at the 3rd quarter of 
FY1998.  
  The distribution of change in inventory dependence ratio, the ratio of change in 
inventory to outstanding total asset, shows that its movement is by far smaller than  27
that of receivables or payables. The close relationship between inventory and trade 
credit, that is, receivables and payables, that the conventional wisdom takes it obvious 
and for granted, is unclear (for the details see Miwa [2010e]). The conventional wisdom 
that trade credit has been used for inventory finance will be under pressure for 
reevaluation. 
  The conclusion of Miwa [2008], focusing on the movement of the ratio of change 
in short-term bank borrowing to total asset, that we find no clear sign of serious “credit 
crunch” applies also to the situations where we focus on other financial variables like 
receivables, payables, and inventory and expand our examination to small businesses.     
  Dramatic decrease in the difference variable in payables, particularly for v4=8, 
in the 3rd quarter of FY2008, immediately after the Lehman Shock is prominent. 
  What shown above holds with little modification when I limit the examination 
to the manufacturing sector. 
 
Fruitful Result of the Government’s Appropriate and Effective Policy Response? 
  Not a few readers might think: “Even if we find no remarkable observation to 
be judged as a clear sign of serious ‘credit crunch’ and ‘financial crisis’, it might be a 
fruitful result of the government’s appropriate and effective policy response. Wouldn’t it 
an overstatement to say that it raises even a strong doubt about the potential severity of 
the financial crisis?” 
  First of all, readers should ask themselves: “What is the specific nature of the 
‘government’s appropriate and effective policy response’?” and “Have I ever seen 
persuasive logical grounds and evidence of the claim that it worked effectively?” Note 
that, both now and then, what reaches our ears is mostly voices either of parties 
concerned like bureaucrats in relevant government sections and those in financial 
institutions and of newspersons supposed to monitor them at close range. In Japan, 
where rarely the specific details of policy decision-making is disclosed in public, in 10 
years for instance, nothing other than those voices of parties concerned remains lodged 
in public’s brain. Readers should ask themselves also: “How did the public, including 
depositors and borrowing firm’s managers, expect the behavior and policy response of 
the government for prevention and avoidance of financial institution’s failures and for 
avoiding ‘crisis’ and ‘confusion’ accompanied by their failures, and also the behavior of 
financial institutions and the movement in the financial market? How did they prepare 
and  respond?”   
  At this time, financial institutions including big ones, alleged never to fall into 
bankruptcy, went bankrupt in sequence. It took almost a year for the policy debates that  28
got active in parallel with those events settled and enforced. During this period, widely 
recognized as the peak of the “Heisei Financial Crisis”, “financial issues” were of 
particular interest both to the media and to the public. It was impossible that both the 
depositors and borrowers, upon an overwhelming reliability on the government’s 
appropriate and effective policy responses, neither experienced anxiety nor generated 
disruption.  
With the collapse on 22 November 1997 of Yamaichi Securities, following the 
failure of Sanyo Securities on 3 and of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank on 17, the “financial 
crisis” reached full force in Japan, and that of Tokuyo City Bank on 26 followed. On 
December 5 the Ministry of Finance announced to protect all the bank deposits and 
financial bonds until March 2001. On 12 January 1998 in his speech to Congress Prime 
Minister Hashimoto declared that Japan would not trigger a global financial panic. The 
government was forced to take the control both of The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 
on 23 October 1998 and of the Bond Credit Bank of Japan on December 13. It was on 12 
March 1999 when the Financial Revitalizing Committee, created on 5 December 1998, 
decided the injection of public funds, ¥7.4592 trillion in total, to 15 banks. Even if the 
infusion worked well and played a critical role, already one year and four months had 
passed since November 1997.16  
The Japanese economy, firm’s financing behavior of the time in particular, 
offers an intriguing “laboratory” to study the borrowers’ behavior in response to the 
realization process to bank failures of lending financial institutions including big banks. 
It is an “experimental” opportunity to obtain valuable information for grave agenda: 
“How borrowing firms prepare and respond to the possible failure of individual banks 
and “confusion”, often called a “systemic risk”, on the diffusion process that follows the 
failures. Also the individual bank’s response to borrowers is non-uniform. Firm’s 
response, optimizing behavior under constraints, must be non-uniform, and we could 
expect to obtain information about the determinants of firm’s responding behavior. 
The conventional wisdom on which the research at the start was designed 
deviated substantially from the reality, however. Concerning the “financial crisis” and 
“credit crunch” at the end of the 1990s it overestimated the consequences of financial 
institution’s failures including big banks’. Upon this overestimation, the government 
                                                  
16  For more details, see the “Time-line of Events on Financial System: 1965-2002” in 
Nishimura [2003, pp.458-61]. For a brief review of the process, see Miwa [2008, pp.6-8]. 
Reader should ask carefully: “Did the public fund injection work effectively and greatly 
contribute to the ‘financial stability’?” and “Did this injection improve the national 
welfare?” If the “disease” this “treatment” targeted (or alleged to target) was slight or 
non-existent, the performance evaluation of the treatment would be minor (or negative).  29
made every effort for avoiding bank failure to occur, delaying the adoption of necessary 
policies. And on top of that, with almost no preparations (because the government 
intended to emphasize that there was no possibility of bank failures, particularly of big 
banks, or used it as an excuse) Japan climaxed with a sequence of bank failures and 
confusion in policy responses. It resulted in a “crisis” and “panic” in financial 
institutions and financial administration, with which people in and around the “panic”, 
particularly the media and academics including “Japanese government watchers”, were 
deeply impressed.   
Investigation on firm financing behavior under the “financial crisis” from the 
end of 1997 to the beginning of 1999 does indeed suggest that it was a fiasco caused by 
the confusion of a “crisis of financial institutions” with a “financial crisis”. Similarly, the 
failure possibility of financial institutions including jusen housing loan companies, big 
financial institutions in particular, and also the severity of “confusion” that follows the 
failures might have been significantly overestimated, and intentionally exaggerated. 
The cost that an often stressed expression, “too big to fail”, assumes might have been 
left un-estimated due to the false assumption that is simply a “myth”.17 
 
V. Zero-bank-borrowing Firms vs. Positive-bank-borrowing Firms 
 
  It must not be only the present author that was surprised and shocked at the 
findings: (1) In so many firms the outstanding amount of short-term-bank-borrowings 
was zero (y1t-1=0), its ratio to the total was higher in smaller firm size classes; (2) The 
number of such zero-short-term-borrowing firms increased under the recent 
“zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” monetary policy, the ratio of which today to the 
level of 2/3 in the smallest-size firms class. Not a few readers would be interested in a 
forward-looking question: “There must be an essential difference between 
‘zero-bank-borrowing’ firms and ‘positive-bank-borrowing’ firms, from which we would 
obtain valuable information for understanding the reality of the financial market.” The 
second half of Miwa [2010d] investigated along this question.   
In [III-4]~[III-7], as the first step of investigating the relationships among 
relevant variables, I compare the two groups of firms, firms with 
positive-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (type A, y1t-1>0) and 
                                                  
17  Readers who wonder that, although so many love to refer to the phrase, “too big to 
fail”, too few go into its details and necessary measures for its prevention should see 
John Kay [2009] and Taylor [2010]. For the definition and identification of SIFIs 
(systemically important financial institutions) which recently we see frequently, see 
Jackson [2010], Stroebel [2010].  30
firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B, y1t-1=0). It is based on the 
expectation that there is an essential difference between two types of firms, which is 
revealed in firm’s choice, so that through comparison we will obtain useful information 
and hints for future research on the decision mechanism on short-term bank borrowing 
and the causality in making decisions concerning financial variables. It is to seek a clue 
to think: “Is it because they could not obtain loans from banks? Or they did not take it?” 
“On what factors their decision depends?” 
I find no prominent difference in any individual items between two firm groups. 
For example, no prominence difference became obvious during the “credit crunch” in 
1997-1999 or the “financial crisis” of 2007. 
 
Comparison of firms with positive-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the 
quarter (type A) and firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B):   
Distribution of individual item’s composition ratio (lit)    
  [III-4] and [III-5] focus on the individual item’s composition ratio (level 
variables, lit), and [III-6] and [III-7] on the difference variables (dit). 
  For illustration, here I introduce two figures on the distribution of payable 
dependence ratio (Figure 10a and Figure 10b, l5t), for all firms surveyed in all industries, 
and their comparison table (Table 8, III-4-4). 
Figure 10a. Distribution of Payable-dependence Ratio (l
5
t):
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Figure 10b. Distribution of Payable-dependence Ratio (l
5
t):




































Table 8. Distribution of payable-dependence ratio (l
5
t): Comparison of firms in Type A and Type B:
all industries, all size firms, unit=%
mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Firms with non-zero-short- Average 1 17.53 0.21 4.38 13.86 25.48 39.64
term-bank-borrowing Average 2 15.49 0.10 3.48 11.54 22.49 35.83
at the beginning of the quarter Average T 16.54 0.15 3.94 12.74 24.03 37.80
(A) Av.1 - Av.2 2.04 0.11 0.89 2.32 2.98 3.81
Firms with zero-short-term- Average 1 15.46 0.00 0.00 6.34 22.30 44.84
bank-borrowing Average 2 15.30 0.00 0.07 6.95 21.83 42.57
at the beginning of the quarter Average T 15.39 0.00 0.03 6.64 22.07 43.75
(B) Av.1 - Av.2 0.16 0.00 -0.07 -0.61 0.47 2.27
A v e r a g e   1 2 . 0 70 . 2 14 . 3 87 . 5 23 . 1 8 - 5 . 2 0
(A) - (B) Average 2 0.18 0.10 3.41 4.59 0.66 -6.74
A v e r a g e   T 1 . 1 50 . 1 53 . 9 16 . 1 01 . 9 6 - 5 . 9 5
Av.1 - Av.2 1.88 0.11 0.96 2.93 2.52 1.54  
Next, I list “particularly prominent observations” in [III-4] for all industries (III-4-1). 
(1) Both in all industries and in the manufacturing industry, there is a 
remarkable difference between two groups of firms in the level of the ratio of deposit to 
total asset, particularly in p50, p75, p90, and the mea n  v a l u e .  T h i s  p a t t e r n  h a s  
consistently continued over the study period. However, for instance the p50 value of 
type B falls far short of the p75 value of type A, which shows that not all the type B 
firms hold higher ratio (to total asset) of deposit than all the type A firms. 
(2) There is a prominent difference between two types of firms in long-term 
bank dependence ratio. In addition, concerning the type B firms there is a noteworthy 
difference between the first half and the second half of the period. (We executed 
comparison by firm size of the distribution of long-term bank dependence ratio in [I-2-4] 
for all industries, and in [I-3-2] for the manufacturing industry.) Particularly for the 
type B large firms, the long-term bank dependence ratio decreased dramatically in the 
second half period. 
(3) Rather we had better pay the prime attention to the observation that there 
is no difference between two types of firms, concerning receivable, payable, and  32
inventory. In addition, there is no difference in that distribution pattern remains stable 
throughout most of the study period and that during the period of recent “financial 
crisis” both ratios of receivable and payable (but not inventory) decreased dramatically.   
 
Comparison of firms with positive-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the 
quarter (type A) and firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B):   
Distribution of change in individual item’s composition ratio (dit) 
  [III-6] and [III-7] examine the distribution of change in individual item’s 
composition ratio, comparing two groups of firms, firms with positive-short- 
term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (type A, y1t>0) and firms with 
zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B, y1t=0). Basically, examination methods are the 
same as the ones adopted for lit in [III-4] and [III-5]. 
   For illustration, here as well I introduce two figures on the distribution of 
change in payable dependence ratio (Figure 11a and Figure 11b, d5t), for all firms 
surveyed in all industries, and their comparison table (Table 9, III-6-4). 
Figure 11a. Distribution of Changes in Payable-dependence Ratio (d
5
t):



































Figure 11b. Distribution of Changes in Payable-dependence Ratio (d
5
t):



































Table9. Distribution of changes in payabl- dependence ratio (d
5
t): Comparison of firms in Type A and Type B:
all industries, all size firms, unit=%
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Firms with non-zero-short- Average 1 -5.00 -1.48 -0.01 1.56 4.86
term-bank-borrowing Average 2 -4.30 -1.25 -0.02 1.40 4.47
at the beginning of the quarter Average T -4.66 -1.37 -0.01 1.48 4.67
(A) Av.1 - Av.2 -0.70 -0.22 0.02 0.16 0.39
Firms with zero-short-term- Average 1 -5.46 -0.82 0.00 0.92 5.31
bank-borrowing Average 2 -5.06 -0.87 0.00 1.04 5.20
at the beginning of the quarter Average T -5.27 -0.84 0.00 0.98 5.26
(B) Av.1 - Av.2 -0.40 0.05 0.00 -0.12 0.11
Average 1 0.46 -0.66 -0.01 0.64 -0.45
(A) - (B) Average 2 0.76 -0.39 -0.02 0.36 -0.73
Average T 0.60 -0.53 -0.01 0.51 -0.58
Av.1 - Av.2 -0.30 -0.27 0.02 0.28 0.28  
   
VI. Concluding Remarks and Interesting Observations from the Research this Paper is 
Based on 
 
  This paper is based on a part of my previous research on Japanese firm’s 
financing behavior using firm-level CEQStat data.   
  Firms have maintained a dependence on financial institutions (=borrowings 
from financial institutions/ total assets) well below the level that the conventional 
wisdom has claimed, which further fell drastically in recent years, particularly in the 
21st century under the “zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” monetary policy (in this 
paper I call those phenomena “ginko-banare”, or “independence of the firms from 
banks”.  
    Keeping this “independence of the firms from banks” in mind, I investigated 
the financing behavior of Japanese firms during the period from the end of 1997 to the 
beginning of 1999 and found no prominent phenomena as clear signs of “financial crisis” 
or “credit crunch”. In addition, I find no persuasive grounds, either logical foundation or  34
evidences, that support the conventional wisdom that a severe “credit crunch” occurred 
during this period in Japan. It was a fiasco caused by the confusion of a “crisis of 
financial institutions” and “financial administration” with “financial crisis”. 
  What is critically important here is that CEStat, CEQStat in particular, that 
provides relevant statistical information by far of the best quality, has rarely been used 
effectively in research on financial phenomena or policy debates. Instead, the 
conventional wisdom that financial institutions, big banks in particular, have 
dominated the Japanese financial market and played there the key roles has long been 
an obvious basic assumption in researches and policy debates over the Japanese 
financial phenomena. As shown above, this conventional wisdom which has been widely 
accepted, although upon scant grounds, is a misconception, a myth substantially 
deviating from the reality, implying that both the academic researches and policy 
debates that have long dominated the fields are “house of cards” or “mirage”.   
  In light of the position the conventional wisdom still occupies now, the most 
basic message of this research might be that CEQStat that provides relevant statistical 
information by far of the best quality, particularly about small business firms, has 
rarely been used effectively in research on financial phenomena or policy debates, and 
that its active use is an effective way out of the present miserably confusing situation. 
  As mentioned above in Section I, this article is based on a part of my previous 
research. Although it is an important part, it is just around the entrance. It is my hope 
that readers who got interested in this paper entitled, “Are Japanese Firms Becoming 
More Independent from Their Banks?”, proceed to the whole research including its 
problem settings and used data.   
As a consequence of the basic character, this research draws few clear 
“conclusions” directly, and it does not fit in so easily with “summary”. Instead, I list 
below points and observations that I found impressive on the process of the study and 
still remain interesting to me at its close, which I believe useful for readers in 
understanding behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in particular, and 
information organized in the report.     
 
(1)  Even when I focus only on financing (and asset allocation), the behavior of firms in 
Japan ranges widely. Together with “representative figures” obtainable also from 
summary statistics published as the result of CEStat (CEAStat and CEQStat) 
surveys, particularly for understanding the reality of great diversity in Japanese 
firms we should promote mote active utilization of firm-level data from those 
statistics.  35
(2)  In light of the low bank dependence ratio (much lower than the conventional 
wisdom has claimed), the relationship between bank’s lending- and firm’s 
borrowing behavior is by far remoter than has been widely assumed. The analytical 
method, that has been a foundation of the conventional wisdom, adopts the 
information about bank’s lending behavior as a good substitute of firm’s borrowing 
behavior, implicitly assuming either one-to-one correspondence or virtual 
integration. It has been a source of misunderstanding and a cause of big troubles. 
Examination of firm’s financing and asset allocation behavior, too, must be 
conducted upon exact reality of examination objects.   
(3)  With the exception of listed firms for which security filings are available, CEStat is 
about the only source that provides good statistical information about firms 
including small businesses in Japan. Nevertheless, CEStat including the published 
summary statistics has rarely been utilized in researches and policy debates on 
financial phenomena and finance related policies including small business policies.   
As a result, the conventional wisdom that has been a foundation of those 
researches and policies is a misconception, misunderstanding, or a myth 
substantially deviating from the reality. Not only such a situation has been left as 
it is but also it has faced with few serious challenge or sense of crisis. 
(4)  The evil of above point (3) is particularly serious concerning small business. In 
Japan, small businesses have received special treatment in a world of this “myth”. 
Recent heated policy discussion (or fiasco) over the “bank’s reluctance to small 
business lending” and rapid expansion of related policies are symbolic. 
Unsurprisingly, neither coherent logical explanation nor persuasive evidence is 
presented. 
(5)  What is the most surprising and impressive in this research is the Japanese firm’s 
low bank (to be precise, financial institutions) dependence ratio, the ratio of bank 
borrowing, short-term borrowing in particular, to total asset. Even in the 1960s the 
bank dependence ratio was by far lower than has been claimed by the conventional 
wisdom, and since then it has consistently decreased to the present. I think it 
appropriate to call it “‘low bank dependence’ and ‘further increase in independence 
of firms from banks’”. I was deeply surprised to find that this “increase in 
independence” has accelerated under the ultra-easy credit policy under 
“zero-lending-rate” in the 2000s and that these “low bank dependence ratio” and 
“further increase in independence from banks” have been more prominent among 
small businesses than among ultra-big excellent companies that are alleged to be 
advantageous in making access to international capital market.  36
(6)  With the sole exception of receivable-payable relations (stable high positive 
correlation coefficient is symbolic), the study of inter-relations among composition 
variables such as short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, deposit, receivable, 
payable, and inventory shows no noteworthy strong relation. Moreover, it is 
impressive that such inter-relationship is observed stably throughout the study 
period. No long-term changing trend is observed. No prominent change is observed 
during the “credit crunch” in 1997-1999 and the “financial crisis” of 2007, either. 
(7)  The above point (6) with little modification applies also to the study of 
inter-relations among changes in composition ratios. I expected to find prominent 
phenomena that had emerged in response to “outside shocks” during the “credit 
crunch” in 1997-1999 or in the “financial crisis” of 2007, which would be useful in 
understanding the inter-relations among changes in composition ratios. 
Unfortunately, however, no such prominent phenomena recognized to be a sign of 
those shocks. Of the points (6) and (7), I was more deeply surprised at the stability 
of inter-relations among changes in composition ratios.   
(8)  Concerning any of short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, and total borrowing 
(sum of short-term- and long-term borrowing), there is no close relationship with 
other financial variables studied in this research. For example, there is no 
observation that suggests an often claimed relation that firms finding difficulty in 
obtaining bank borrowing actively use payables as its alternative funding source. 
(9)  We have only extremely poor information about trade credit, both detailed basic 
information and explanations on its transaction. Under such a situation, the view 
that “trade credit is used primarily for inventory finance” has been accepted as the 
conventional wisdom. This view, however, is obscure and vague, whose substance is 
almost completely unclear. Investigation on the basis of CEStat shows that, 
whatever the interpretation, this conventional wisdom is not supported by the 
data. 
(10)  Of inter-relationships among receivable, payable, and inventory, the relation 
between receivable and payable is strong and stable, but the one between 
inventory and receivable or payable is neither strong nor stable. The conventional 
wisdom has long argued, “trade credit is the means for large companies that enjoy 
advantages in bank borrowing to supply credit to small businesses”. Data from the 
CEStat do not support this view, either in the study period of FY1994-FY2009 or in 
several decades since the 1960s.   
(11)    The research covers the period when the financial market since the burst of 
“Bubble” has been roller-coaster and a series of close encounters with new  37
unknown phenomena. Observers consistently criticized that the various troubles 
and slow response in related policies have been an important cause of the “Lost 
Two Decades”. On various fronts I was often surprised at a weak (or no) 
correspondence between observations drawn from data and the widely accepted 
“facts”. Most symbolically, I find not serious impact of the “credit crunch” in 
1997-1999 on firm’s financing behavior, including that of the impact of actual 
collapse of several financial institutions which had been alleged to be so grave.   
(12)  Heated discussion and prominent expansion of small business policies 
symbolizes the Japanese economy during the past two decades since the burst of 
“Bubble”, the so-called “Lost Two Decades”. Emphasizing the seriousness of “banks’ 
reluctance to small business lending” and its decisive importance to the Japanese 
economy, the Japanese government expanded small business policies on a 
historically unprecedented scale and scope, at the center of which is the “credit 
guarantee policy”. In none of its necessity, importance as policy issue, and 
effectiveness and efficiency of the policy that ensures its continuous 
implementation, either coherent logical explanation or persuasive evidence is 
available. It is not easy to draw grounds to support any of them from the study of 
firm’s financing (asset allocation) behavior using firm-level data from the CEQStat. 
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